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No Global Demos, No Global Democracy? 
A Systematization and Critique∗ 
 
Laura Valentini 
 
Abstract: A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is 
considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth 
pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No 
global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of 
democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the 
pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical 
slogan—each based on a specific account of the notion of “the demos”—and 
concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be 
abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections 
against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate 
and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal.  
 
Key words: global democracy; demos; desirability; feasibility; all affected interests 
principle; reasonable disagreement.  
Introduction 
Our world is ever more globalized. It is home to a growing network of commercial, 
financial, and cultural relations transcending state boundaries. Over the past twenty 
years, the process of globalization has been at the heart of lively debates within 
explanatory political science as well as normative political theory.  
 From an explanatory point of view, scholars have focused on the effects of 
globalization. They have addressed questions such as whether global economic 
integration is—at least partly—responsible for: the perceived decline of the welfare 
state in high-income countries,1 the rise of inequalities in developing countries,2 and 
global environmental change.3 From a normative point of view, discussions have 
focused on the appropriate institutional responses to globalizing trends. Some have 
advocated the establishment of global redistributive schemes aimed at bridging the 
socio-economic gap between developed and developing countries.4 Others have 
championed targeted reforms of the international arena, with a view to combating 
problematic globalization-related phenomena such as tax competition,5 the brain 
drain,6 and dangerous climate change.7 Others still have debated what legitimacy 
standards ought to constrain the transnational and global forms of power we are now 
subjected to.8 
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A popular view within the latter debate—the view I shall investigate in this 
paper—is that legitimacy beyond borders, just like domestic legitimacy, requires 
democratic decision-making. To be sure, advocates of this view champion different 
institutional configurations of the international arena, ranging from a centralized 
democratic global government, to a diffuse scheme of global governance, in which 
different international institutions and networks operate democratically.9 These 
differences notwithstanding, the idea of democracy beyond borders—involving the 
creation of transnational and/or supranational sites of democratic deliberation and 
decision-making—is the object of lively discussions in the growing field of 
international political theory.  
 Predictably, not everyone is sympathetic to the prospect of a democratically 
organized global order. There is considerable disagreement about whether global 
democracy constitutes an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for 
scepticism about global democracy is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no 
global democracy.”  
This slogan—in the general form “no demos, no democracy”—was first 
employed in relation to the European Union, as a concise explanation for its perceived 
democratic deficit.10 The lack of a demos, namely of a European people united by 
common sympathies and willing to cooperate in addressing shared problems, was 
(and continues to be) seen as a major cause for the slow progress of the European 
political project.11 The same slogan—or at any rate the logic behind it—has been 
embraced, mutatis mutandis, by global-democracy skeptics.12 After all, if the absence 
of a demos raises concerns about the viability of democracy in the E.U., a fortiori it 
should raise concerns for the pursuit of democracy at the global level. As Robert 
Keohane puts it, there is no “global public,” in that both (i) clear criteria determining 
who is entitled to participate in decision-making and (ii) “a sense of common destiny” 
are missing at the international level.13 This, critics of global democracy conclude, 
makes global democracy normatively unattractive,14 and “utopian in the sense of 
illusory.”15 On this view, the democratic standards we hold dear at the domestic level 
have no meaningful role to play at the global one. Democracy beyond borders is not 
an ideal worth pursuing. 
 Are these skeptical claims warranted? Does the reasoning behind the slogan 
“No global demos, no global democracy” carry a knock-down objection to the global 
democratic ideal? To answer this question, I discuss four interpretations of the 
slogan—each based on a specific account of “the demos”—and conclude that none of 
them implies that global democracy is not an ideal worth pursuing. My aim in doing 
so is twofold. First, I want to clarify and systematize different types of objections 
against global democracy, often implicit in the “no global demos” thesis. In doing so, 
I navigate my way through the literature, offering what I hope is a novel and useful 
map of an intricate conceptual terrain. Second, I want to offer a robust but qualified 
defence of the global democratic ideal, which takes skeptics’ worries seriously, but 
also vindicates the normative and practical relevance of democracy beyond borders.16 
My defence is robust insofar as it shows that global democracy is normatively 
desirable across different criteria for determining who has a right to participate in 
political decisions, and not just based on the much-discussed “all-affected-interests” 
principle.17 My defence is qualified in that, unlike other defenses, it does not proclaim 
the near-inevitability18 or relatively straightforward accessibility of global 
democracy.19 Instead, it acknowledges that global democracy is a distant ideal that 
cannot be realized in the near future, without concluding that it is not worth pursuing 
or “utopian in the sense of illusory.”20  
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In coming to this conclusion, I engage with both critics and advocates of 
global democracy, from the perspectives of normative political theory as well as 
empirical political science/International Relations (IR). On the one hand, my 
discussion takes seriously, though ultimately rejects, the skeptical arguments offered 
by authors such as Robert Keohane, Robert Dahl, David Miller, and Sarah Song; on 
the other hand, it sympathetically qualifies some of the most prominent defenses of 
global democracy, ranging from David Held’s and Daniele Archibugi’s to Arash 
Abizadeh’s, Robert Goodin’s and John Dryzek’s.  
Moreover, although the paper’s discussion is conducted, for the most part, in 
the style of analytic normative political theory, its intended audience is broader than 
that—as reflected by the range of literatures surveyed. Specifically, the paper attempts 
to show both how normative debates can have implications for real-world policy 
discussions (e.g., about what forms of accountability and legitimation are appropriate 
at the international level) and, conversely, how findings from empirical political 
science and IR may help us adjudicate normative questions (e.g., about the 
desirability of global democracy). 
 The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I set out the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an ideal to count as worth pursuing: desirability, non-
infeasibility, and moral accessibility. In the second and third sections, I define the 
notions of “democracy” and “demos.” In the fourth section, I consider four different 
interpretations of the skeptical slogan. They respectively suggest that, due to the lack 
of a global demos, global democracy is: undesirable, infeasible now, altogether 
infeasible, and morally inaccessible. I argue that only the claim that global democracy 
is infeasible now warrants endorsement, but that it does not undermine the normative 
or practical relevance of the global democratic ideal. I conclude that no version of the 
slogan “No global demos, no global democracy” succeeds in establishing that global 
democracy is not worth pursuing. However, my arguments also suggest that its 
pursuit should be carried out cautiously, keeping in mind—as critics of global 
democracy have correctly insisted—that the preconditions for democracy to be 
successfully established at the global level are presently missing. This paper therefore 
points towards a fruitful, and somewhat under-explored, middle ground between 
global-democratic enthusiasts and skeptics.  
Political Ideals  
We all entertain ideals of various kinds: about the sorts of persons we want to be, the 
jobs we want to have, or the partner we want to build a life with. Ideals are familiar 
entities in our horizon of thought, but not all of them are worth pursuing.21 I suggest 
that, in order to be worth pursuing, ideals must meet three necessary and sufficient 
conditions: desirability, non-infeasibility, and moral accessibility.22 
 
 Desirability: An ideal is desirable if it depicts a state of affairs in which 
 “good things” are realized. 
  
Ideals are desirable almost by definition: a dreaded scenario would never be described 
as “an ideal.” It is important to keep in mind, however, that the desirability of any 
given state of affairs depends on the particular normative perspective we adopt. For 
example, while those on the “political left” regard significant levels of redistributive 
taxation as desirable (i.e., ideal); those on “the right” do not. The labeling of any state 
of affairs as “an ideal,” then, is perspective-dependent. But once we assume a given 
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normative perspective—which, in our case, is democratic (see the next section for 
details)—we can at least broadly identify what is desirable, and what is not.  
 
 Non-infeasibility. An ideal is non-infeasible if we have reason to hope that it 
 can be realized, or at least approximated.23  
 
This condition is met when ideals are not proven infeasible.24 I illustrate what this 
criterion involves by first examining the notion of feasibility, and then explaining its 
relationship to non-infeasibility. 
 Criteria of feasibility can be defined in a variety of ways, from very narrow to 
rather expansive.25 It may not be feasible for a young lecturer, Mary, to become a 
professor if by “feasible” we mean “feasible here and now.” However, there is a 
broader sense in which it is feasible for Mary to do so. There is arguably a possible 
world, accessible from the existing world, in which she is a professor; if she continues 
to work hard, she might eventually get there.  
 When it comes to political ideals, the sense of feasibility we should be 
interested in is a fairly permissive one. It would be excessively conservative to say 
that the ideal of a just society is not feasible because it cannot be realized tomorrow. 
By this standard of feasibility, hardly any political ideal would count as feasible. A 
more plausible account of feasibility stipulates that a political ideal is feasible when 
(i) it is in principle compatible with the basic features of human nature as we know it, 
and (ii) it can be achieved or approximated from the status quo.26 
 For instance, a society of angels might be desirable, but for obvious reasons it 
is not feasible: it fails to meet (i), and must therefore be declared not worth pursuing; 
to borrow once again Keohane’s phrase, it is “utopian in the sense of illusory.” 
Somewhat similarly, a world of mutually independent political communities might be 
desirable, but given existing globalizing trends, it is arguably infeasible: it violates 
(ii). There is no possible world, accessible from the existing world, in which a truly 
Westphalian system of states can emerge or be approximated. 
 So far, I have sketched an account of feasibility for political ideals. Recall, 
though, that we are ultimately interested in something weaker than that: non-
infeasibility. Why? Because positively establishing that an ideal is feasible is often 
too onerous. Such positive establishment requires the identification of a path from the 
status quo to a world in which the relevant ideal is fully instantiated or approximated. 
Given the complexities and contingencies of human existence, this is too much to ask 
for. If proving feasibility were a necessary condition for an ideal to count as worth 
pursuing, many ideals that are clearly worth pursuing would lose their normative 
power and, as other scholars have also pointed out, our normative outlooks would 
thereby become excessively status-quo biased.27 Consider the ideal of a slavery-free 
society. Positively establishing the feasibility of this ideal, by conclusively showing 
how slavery could be abolished and what form of social organization could replace it, 
would have been virtually impossible when slavery was a dominant social practice. 
Yet it would have been a mistake to infer from this that the abolition of slavery was 
not worth pursuing. In fact, doing so would have arguably turned the alleged 
infeasibility of a slavery-free society into a self-fulfilling prophecy: if an ideal is not 
pursued, it is unlikely to be realized.  
 To establish that an ideal is worth pursuing, then, all we need is enough 
ground for reasonably hoping that the ideal can be realized or approximated, not a 
“full demonstration” of its feasibility. 
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 Moral accessibility:28 An ideal is morally accessible if we have reason to hope 
 that it can be realized or approximated without excessive moral costs.  
 
Whether an ideal is all-things-considered worth pursuing depends on what Juha 
Räikkä calls the “moral costs of transition” towards that ideal, measured by the 
standards of the normative perspective adopted—again, democratic in our case.29 If 
getting to the ideal would create much damage along the way (more damage than our 
normative perspective allows), then we have to declare the ideal not worth pursuing. 
Plainly, if the only way of bringing about a just world were through a Third World 
War, the ideal of a just world would be morally inaccessible, hence not worth striving 
for. 
 In sum, an ideal is worth pursuing if, and only if, it is desirable, non-
infeasible, and morally accessible from where we are.  
Democracy  
Democracy is a paradigmatic example of what W.B. Gallie called “essentially 
contested” concepts.30 There are many different competing conceptions of what “true” 
or “real” democracy amounts to, and virtually endless disputes about which one best 
expresses democracy’s value. Since defending any one of these conceptions would 
take us too far from the topic of the present paper, here I limit myself to the following, 
ecumenical definition.  
 
 Democracy: A political system is democratic if, and only if, those to 
 whom its decisions apply31 have the opportunity to participate in their making 
 as equals (for short “have a say in them”).  
 
The present definition of democracy embodies the idea, reflected in its etymology, of 
giving “power to the people” in the making of political decisions. As anticipated, the 
definition is neutral across, and compatible with, different conceptions of what count 
as appropriate forms of collective decision-making. That is, it is consistent with 
models of democracy based on deliberation and participation in discourses, as well as 
models based on voting and elections of representatives (or combinations of the two).  
 No matter what specific institutional operationalization of democracy we 
favour, its value rests on a commitment to equal respect for persons qua self-
determining agents, capable of leading their lives pursuing their ends and goals. 
Specifically, democracy is said to be both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable on 
grounds of equal respect.32  
 First, it is instrumentally valuable because it ensures that social outcomes are, 
to the extent that this is possible, responsive to everyone’s interests.33 Second, it is 
intrinsically valuable because it expresses the equal status of persons in the face of 
reasonable disagreement—namely disagreement between rational people committed 
to equal respect—about how society should be governed.34 By allowing for 
participation in collective decision-making, democratic procedures treat people with 
equal respect as rational, autonomous agents.35 A democratic commitment to equal 
respect so understood undergirds the normative perspective from which the rest of my 
analysis is conducted.   
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The Demos 
The idea of a “demos” is both contested and elusive. To clarify it, I start by 
distinguishing, with Christian List and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, between two 
understandings of the demos: compositional and performative.36 Put in the terms of 
the present paper, the former—which is mentioned, but not discussed, by List and 
Koenig-Archibugi37—employs a criterion of normative desirability, and identifies 
those who, given fundamental democratic commitments, should be included in the 
decision-making body. The latter, by contrast, employs a criterion of feasibility, and 
sets out the conditions that must be satisfied by a group of people in order for it to be 
capable of supporting a democratic decision-making system. In what follows, I briefly 
discuss each in turn. I refer to the demos understood compositionally as “demosC,” 
and to the demos understood performatively as “demosP.”38 
The DemosC 
As I have mentioned earlier, central to democracy is the principle of equal respect for 
persons. Equal respect demands that all be given the opportunity to participate in the 
decisions that apply to them as equals. But under what conditions does a decision 
apply to someone? Two answers are particularly prominent in the literature: “when 
one is subject to a decision” and “when one is affected by a decision.”39 The former 
corresponds to the so-called “all-subjected principle,” the latter to the so-called “all-
affected interests principle.”40 To make my argument against the no-global-demos 
thesis as robust as possible, here I do not subscribe to one or the other conception of 
the demosC. Rather, I set out the strongest version of each of them and, in the next 
section, show that the no-global-demos thesis fails to undermine the global 
democratic ideal independently of which one we adopt. Let me start with the all-
subjected principle, versions of which have been discussed and/or proposed by Arash 
Abizadeh, Ludvig Beckman, Christopher McMahon, Sofia Näsström, and David 
Owen.41 
 
 All-subjected principle: All and only legal subjects should have a say in the 
 making of the legal decisions that bind them. 
 
This principle holds that all and only those who are legally obligated to abide by the 
law, i.e., legal subjects, should be entitled to democratic participation. The democratic 
commitment to equal respect for autonomous agency, so the argument goes, demands 
that legal subjection be accompanied by a right to participate in the making of legal 
decisions. Why? Because participation establishes a connection between the will of 
the subjects and the will of the ruler, allowing the autonomy of the former not to be 
undermined by the latter’s authority. The principle can be summarized in the 
following slogan: “no legal obligation without participation.” 
 Although the democratic impetus behind this formulation of the principle is 
clear enough, some scholars—most prominently Arash Abizadeh—have plausibly 
objected that democratic entitlements should follow de facto, as opposed to legal, 
subjection. After all, coercive laws—i.e., commands backed by the threat of 
sanctions—may de facto apply to, and thereby constrain the autonomy of, individuals 
who are not recognized as legal subjects, and thus not legally obligated to obey.42 For 
instance, we can easily imagine a state refusing to consider refugees as “subjects,” 
thus placing them under no legal obligations, while at the same time subjecting them 
to autonomy-impairing coercion.43 This suggests that a more plausible formulation of 
	   7 
the all-subjected principle is captured by the slogan: “no de facto coercion without 
participation.” 
 
All-subjected principlerevised: All and only those who are de facto subjected 
to coercive legal decisions should have a say in the making of those 
decisions.44 
 
This version of the all-subjected principle arguably better embodies the democratic 
ideal of equal respect for autonomy, by postulating that decisions concerning laws 
backed by the threat of sanctions should be made by those de facto subjected to them, 
independently of their formal legal status. But does this improved version of the 
principle fully reflect democratic values? Perhaps it does not.  
 To be sure, coercion (narrowly construed) has a deep impact on persons’ 
interests and autonomy, but people’s autonomy, their ability to lead their lives in 
pursuit of their conceptions of the good, can be equally impacted by non-coercive 
interventions. Consider the frequently mentioned example of a state passing a law 
allowing the construction of nuclear power stations close to its borders.45 Although 
this is not coercive of outsiders in the ordinary sense of the term, the impact that a 
nuclear power station might have on persons’ ability to pursue their ends and goals is 
much greater than the impact of some standardly coercive measures (e.g. a prohibition 
on driving without seat-belts). Focusing on coercion, then, fails fully to honor the 
democratic commitment to equal respect for persons qua autonomous, self-governing 
agents. To honor it fully, democratic theorists such as Gustaf Arrhenius and Robert 
Goodin—among others—argue, we must turn to the all-affected interests principle.46 
 
All-affected interests principle: All and only those who are affected by a 
decision should have a say in its making.  
 
In order to count as affected by a decision, one must have a stake in it. Consider, for 
instance, a choice between the current tax system and an alternative one. Assume that 
the existing system is chosen over the alternative. Even though, relative to the status 
quo, nothing has changed, the maintenance of the old regime has affected all those 
who would have fared differently under the alternative scheme.47  
 While the all-subjected principle—especially in its original version—might 
appear too narrow, the all-affected interests principle seems too broad, and in order to 
gain some plausibility, it needs to be qualified. First, impact on interests should give 
rise to democratic entitlements only when a certain subset of interests, i.e., important 
ones, are affected.48 My town council might have to decide whether to close off a 
particular street over the weekend, thereby making the path I have to take to reach the 
town center a few hundred meters longer. Although this decision affects an interest of 
mine, this interest is of negligible importance, and hence no democratic entitlement is 
required.  
 But notice that reference to important interests still is insufficient to obtain a 
plausible version of the all-affected interests principle. This is because there are 
decisions that affect very important interests and yet we would never want to be 
democratically made. To borrow a famous example by Robert Nozick, if the man I 
love is deciding whether to marry another woman, his decision clearly affects my 
interests, but it would be absurd to claim that I have an entitlement to a say on the 
contemplated marriage.49 Surely, only a certain subset of decisions may plausibly be 
the output of democratic procedures, and marriage is not one of them. Indeed, we 
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typically think that decisions about marriage fall within that area of personal freedom 
which the law ought to protect. This observation suggests a further way of qualifying 
the scope of the all-affected interests principle—and of democracy more generally—
namely via constitutional constraints.50   
 It is typically thought that disagreements about the appropriateness of slavery 
or murder are simply not of the kind that may be settled via democratic deliberation 
and/or vote, because murder and slavery are altogether incompatible with equal 
respect. On this view, there are demands of equal respect that may not be legitimately 
overridden by democratic decision-making. When it comes to those demands, the all-
affected interests principle (and democracy more generally) does not apply.    
 In sum, a suitably qualified, seemingly plausible, version of the all-affected 
interests principle reads as follows: 
 
 All-affected interests principlequalified: All and only those whose important 
 interests are affected by a decision in principle open to democratic 
 adjudication should have a say in its making.51  
 
Having set out the two most prominent (and plausible) candidates for the demosC, 
namely the (revised) all-subjected principle, and the (qualified) all-affected interests 
principle, I now turn to the demosP. 
The DemosP 
The most systematic treatment of the demosP to date, at a conceptual level, is offered 
by List and Koenig-Archibugi. In what follows, I borrow their conceptual framework, 
and combine it with substantive insights from other prominent discussions of the 
demosP.  
From a performative perspective, a group of people qualifies as a demos if, 
and only if, it exhibits a capacity for democratic agency, defined as “the capacity (not 
necessarily actualized) to be organized, in a democratic manner, in such a way as to 
function as a [...] group agent.”52 So conceived, the demosP comprises either the 
electorate in a well-functioning democracy—in which the capacity in question is 
already actualized—or a group of people who, if incorporated in democratic 
institutional arrangements, would allow such arrangements to function properly.  
 List and Koenig-Archibugi further suggest that two conditions have to be met 
for a collection of individuals to display the relevant capacity for democratic agency: 
external coherence and internal cohesion.53 The former refers to the possibility of 
ascribing coherent collective attitudes to the group in question, such as, say, the desire 
to build a nuclear power station. The latter, which is particularly relevant to the 
present discussion, refers to how the attitudes of different members of the group relate 
to each other.  
As other theorists have emphasized, to possess the capacity for democratic 
agency, group members must have common interests, share some substantive 
principles, and be bound by robust enough relationships of mutual trust.54 In this vein, 
David Miller suggests that “for democracy to be possible, there must be sufficient 
convergence of interests and belief among the set of people who will constitute its 
domain.”55 While democracy is needed to make decisions in the face of disagreement, 
democracy cannot work well under conditions where disagreement is too extreme.56 
For instance, in a context lacking a firm commitment to fundamental individual rights 
and the rule of law, meaningful democracy is unlikely to be established. 
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Similar considerations apply to trust. Even if, as argued by Charles Tilly, a 
well-functioning democracy presupposes a modicum of distrust towards elected 
officials (who may be voted out if they underperform), without at least some mutual 
trust, a democracy is equally unable to get off the ground.57 Confidence in one’s 
fellow citizens as well as in one’s rulers is essential if one is to regard them as 
legitimate contributors to, and implementers of, political decisions.  
No Global Demos, No Global Democracy? 
Having offered definitions of democracy and the demos, in this section I discuss four 
interpretations of the skeptical slogan “No global demos, no global democracy,” and 
consider whether any of them succeeds in undermining the ideal of global democracy. 
These interpretations claim, respectively, that global democracy is: (a) undesirable, 
(b) infeasible now, (c) altogether infeasible, and (d) morally inaccessible—and for 
each of these reasons, not worth pursuing. 
a. There is no global demosC, therefore global democracy is undesirable  
The first interpretation looks at the demos from a compositional point of view, and 
suggests that there are no actual or prospective decisions that apply to everyone in the 
world. This being the case, there is no global demosC, therefore global democracy is 
undesirable.  
 The correctness of this claim depends on how we understand the notion of a 
decision “applying to someone.” As illustrated in the previous section, two competing 
understandings are available: the all-subjected and the all-affected interests principle. 
As I will argue in what follows, no matter which understanding one adopts, the first 
version of the skeptical slogan turns out to be false.  
Understanding I: There is no “global subjection to coercive law,” therefore global 
democracy is undesirable 
Is this a plausible claim? It is not. While we currently lack a coercive global state, 
there are nevertheless forms of coercion to which everyone is subjected. A prominent 
example of these, discussed by Arash Abizadeh, is border coercion. Everyone in the 
world has their freedom restricted through coercive border control, and if we 
subscribe to the all-subjected principle, it follows that everyone should have a say in 
the decisions governing these forms of coercion. At the very least, a global 
democratic agency setting limits on people’s freedom of movement is desirable.58 
 One might object, with David Miller, that border control is not strictly 
coercive, but rather, preventative: it prevents people from accessing certain 
opportunities, but does not force them to act in particular ways. And since prevention 
is less autonomy-undermining than coercion, so the argument goes, it does not require 
democratic justification.59 Is this objection convincing? It is not.  
 First, the distinction between coercion and prevention adopted by Miller is far 
from clear-cut. For instance, by preventing an agent from performing all actions 
except for one, we are de facto “coercing” them. Second, most laws that typically 
demand democratic justification can be described as preventative. Tax laws prevent 
people from “keeping” all of their pre-tax income. It would seem odd, though, to 
regard these laws as not coercive, and to consider them unfit for democratic 
justification. If this is right, the objection to the global coerciveness of border control 
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proves ill-grounded.60 If we follow the all-subjected principle, then, we must conclude 
that globally democratic border control is desirable. 
 What is more, border policing is not the only example of global subjection to 
coercion. As Eric Cavallero has recently argued, the international property regime 
may also be described as globally coercive. This regime is constituted by a 
multiplicity of norms—including the international private law of contracts, torts, and 
bilateral investment treaties—identifying who holds what property and which bodies 
have the authority coercively to settle conflicts over property.61  
 Cavallero invokes the coerciveness of the international property regime to 
argue that, if coercion generates a stringent burden of justification for distributive 
inequalities domestically, the same burden exists globally.62 For our purposes, 
Cavallero’s observations can be used to support the claim that, if entitlements to 
democratic participation are triggered by subjection to coercion, then decisions about 
international property law should be taken democratically, by virtually the world at 
large. A global democratic organ setting out the ground-rules of the international 
property regime, in addition to one regulating border control, is therefore morally 
desirable. 
 In sum, from the perspective of the all-subjected principle, there are at least 
two areas of decision-making, namely border control and international property, with 
respect to which the world’s population is entitled to participation. Contrary to the 
first understanding of the skeptical slogan, then, (at least) in matters of border control 
and international property, there exists a global demosC, thus global democratic 
arrangements are desirable. Let me now turn to the all-affected interests principle. 
Understanding II: There is no “global affectedness,” therefore global democracy is 
undesirable 
Are there no issues in which virtually all human beings have a stake, and that may be 
suitably settled democratically (i.e., not at the constitutional level)? Of course there 
are. Interestingly, even critics of global democracy acknowledge that today we are 
faced with genuine global concerns, such as international trade, finance, and 
anthropogenic climate change.63 If we take the all-affected interests principle 
seriously, then, the existence of a global demosC relative to a number of important 
issue-areas appears almost self-evident.64  
 Some, however, disagree. Thomas Christiano, for example, holds that the 
version of the all-affected interests principle relevant to democratic decision-making 
is a very demanding one indeed. In his view, democracy is only desirable when 
people’s interests are affected in roughly equal measure by decisions over time. This 
condition—which obtains between those who share what Christiano calls a “common 
world”—is met within domestic political communities, but not at the global level.65 
Different decisions have different impact on different groups of individuals on the 
global plane. For example, while everyone has stakes in decisions concerning climate 
change, the stakes of the inhabitants of the Maldives islands are typically bigger than 
those of British residents. Or, as Christiano says, “in the World Trade Organization 
some member states have far greater stakes in external trade than other states, as can 
be seen from their very different export to GDP ratios.”66 Under these circumstances, 
giving each person—or each democratic state—an equal say in decisions about 
international trade, or climate change management, would seem unfair, contrary to the 
very principle that underpins democracy: equal respect. What should we make of this 
argument? 
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Even if correct, the claim that there is no cluster of decisions which affect the 
world’s population equally does not show that there is no global demosC. This would 
only be the case if the ideals of equality and popular control central to democracy 
could be operationalized only through equal rights to participate. But this is not so. As 
Harry Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey have argued, equality in decision-making is not 
so central to democratic politics. Rather, key to democracy is the idea that each 
should have a say proportional to their stakes in a decision. The higher the stakes, the 
greater the participatory entitlements an individual ought to have. And when stakes 
are roughly equal, participatory entitlements should also be roughly equal. This is 
what participation “as equals” actually demands.67 
This way of operationalizing the democratic ideal is intuitively appealing, and 
better expresses the commitment to equal respect at the heart of it, by explicitly 
acknowledging that equal respect does not always demand equal treatment. For 
instance, treating able-bodied and disabled people with equal respect might require 
treating them differently, giving the latter subsidies that are unavailable to the 
former.68 Similarly, equal respect demands that the more a decision impacts on 
someone’s interests—provided the decision falls within the legitimate scope of 
democratic adjudication—the more that person ought to have a say in that decision.  
 Some might nevertheless worry that, despite its prima facie appeal, the 
proportional approach to democracy encounters insurmountable difficulties. After all, 
any plausible defence of democracy must be premised on the existence of reasonable 
disagreement about what society ought to do. Yet the same type of disagreement will 
inevitably arise regarding people’s stakes. For any given decision, people will 
reasonably disagree about whose interests are most deeply affected. The proportional 
approach to democracy can only get off the ground if we possess an uncontroversial 
metric for measuring stakes, but since no such uncontroversial metric exists, the 
approach is not viable.69 
 Two points are worth making in response. First, a criterion for measuring 
stakes is necessary not only for democracy operationalized via proportionality, but 
also for democracy operationalized via equality in decision-making, so long as the 
latter requires members of the demosC to have roughly equal stakes.70 
 Second, reasonable disagreements about stakes will inevitably exist, but 
arguably not across all possible decisions. For instance, it is unreasonable to deny 
that, say, the inhabitants of Bangladesh have a greater stake in decisions about how to 
deal with anthropogenic climate change than the residents of the United Kingdom. 
Similarly, it seems clear that legislation about disabled access to public spaces has 
greater impact on people with disabilities than on the rest of a country’s population. 
To the extent that there is some reasonable agreement on stakes, the proportional 
approach can get off the ground.71  
 In sum, there are good reasons for thinking that the democratic ideal need not 
be uniquely operationalized through equality in decision-making. Equality in 
decision-making is a plausible operationalization of that ideal only against a 
background of equal stakes. However, when stakes are unequal—as they are in the 
global realm—the democratic ideal is not mute. From the perspective of the all-
affected interests principle, the ideal requires us to include in the decision-making 
process all those whose important interests are affected, giving them a say roughly 
proportional to their stakes. Since, as already argued, there are decisions to be taken at 
the global level which affect everyone’s important interests at least to some degree, 
from an all-affected interests perspective, a global demosC exists, hence global 
democracy is desirable. 
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In light of the arguments offered so far, I conclude that the first interpretation 
of the slogan “no global demos, no global democracy” is incorrect. There is a global 
demosC on the most plausible accounts of the relevant compositional criteria (all-
subjected and all-affected), therefore global democracy is desirable.   
b. There is no global demosP, therefore global democracy is infeasible now  
Recall that, from a performative point of view, a demos is a collection of individuals 
that exhibits the capacity for democratic agency. If a group of individuals have this 
capacity, they can be incorporated into a democratically organized group agent, and 
make it function well. To say that there is no global demosP, then, is to say that, if a 
global democratic structure were to be imposed on the world as it is today, it would 
not function well.  
 Versions of this argument have been put forward by numerous scholars. 
Central to their scepticism is the conviction that, when it comes to the global realm, 
the condition of internal cohesion necessary for democratic agency remains unmet. 
As Robert Keohane notes, humanity at large is not a group of “people who share a 
sense of common destiny and are in the habit of communicating with one another on 
issues of public policy.”72 Similarly, theorists like David Miller, Sarah Song, and 
Mathias Risse have observed that the peoples of the world currently lack the mutual 
trust, shared principles, and common interests that allow democracy to function at the 
domestic level.73 In light of this, they have declared global democracy presently 
infeasible. 
Importantly, this infeasibility carries an “undesirability” corollary. As liberal 
nationalist and republican thinkers have argued, lacking a robust global demosP, 
attempts to bring about a global democracy are destined to lead to impoverished, 
unstable forms of political engagement, while undermining the richer participatory 
practices currently found at the domestic level.74  
It seems hard to argue against these skeptical claims. The peoples of the world 
have not only different languages, ethnicities and religions, but also different political 
cultures and value systems: not all of them, for instance, share a commitment to 
fundamental individual rights. As mentioned earlier, without such a shared 
commitment, democratic arrangements are unviable. What is more, given the nature 
of contemporary international politics, different peoples are unlikely to sufficiently 
trust each other—and for good reason—to allow for the establishment of a well-
functioning, meaningful global democracy.  
 Note that the problem does not disappear by scaling down our understanding 
of global democracy. As I mentioned at the outset, advocates of global democracy do 
not necessarily defend a democratic global government replicating domestic political 
structures at the global level. Some (in fact most) more modestly campaign for 
democratically governed supra-national institutions addressing global concerns, such 
as international trade and financial regulation, and the management of climate change. 
These, one might be tempted to think, are issues on which the level of agreement is 
sufficient to allow for the existence of a global demosP, and hence of a well-
functioning global democracy.75  
 On reflection, this seems unlikely. Imagine a democratically organized Global 
Climate Management Organization (GCMO). Bangladesh and the Maldives islands 
are about to be submerged, and a decision has to be taken about how to address the 
situation. A democratic vote sanctions the adoption of the “polluters pay” principle, 
resulting in the USA being obligated to accept millions of refugees from the soon-to-
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be-submerged regions.76 This scenario is almost unthinkable in the world as we know 
it today.77 And even if we could imagine this decision being reached, the USA would 
in all likelihood refuse to comply with it. Even issue-specific global democratic 
organs would not function under present circumstances. 
 This is not to deny the existence of a variety of democratizing trends, so to 
say, within the international arena. As John Dryzek points out, these include 
transnational social movements, internet-based deliberations about international 
affairs, pressures to expand the circle of accountability of NGOs and IOs, elections 
taking place at a supranational level (e.g. in the European Union) and so forth.78 
Although these phenomena might be interpreted as evidence for the increasing 
democratization of the global arena, they do not as yet prove the existence of a global 
demosP in the more demanding sense discussed here.79 After all, only a small subset 
of the world’s population is involved in the relevant “democratizing activities.”80 In 
light of this, Richard Falk’s and Andrew Strauss’s claim that global “civil society is 
now capable of founding the Global Peoples Assembly,” i.e., a global democratic 
political structure, appears overly optimistic.81 
 In sum, our discussion has, at least provisionally, validated the claim that there 
is no global demosP, therefore global democracy is infeasible now. But from this we 
are not warranted to conclude that global democracy is not an ideal worth pursuing. 
Recall that a necessary condition for an ideal to be worth pursuing is non-infeasibility. 
This condition is met when an ideal is not proven incompatible with the limits of 
human nature as we know them, as well as not proven inaccessible from the status 
quo. Establishing that an ideal is infeasible now, then, does not automatically render it 
unworthy of pursuit. This leads me to the third interpretation of the skeptical slogan. 
c. A global demosP cannot come about, therefore global democracy is altogether 
infeasible 
The third version of the slogan implies that a global demosP is (i) incompatible with 
human nature and/or (ii) inaccessible from where we are. In what follows, I consider 
each possibility in turn.   
Incompatibility with human nature 
Three main arguments have been put forward purporting to demonstrate the 
incompatibility of a global demosP with some basic constraints of human nature.  
 
Argument 1: The demosP and the nation state 
The first draws a strong connection between the demosP and the nation state, 
suggesting that the former can only exist within the latter. There are two variants of 
this argument: one emphasizes the limits of human solidarity, the other the 
importance of popular sovereignty and “domestic” civic education in the formation of 
the demosP.  
 Solidarity. Scholars have argued that, for a democracy to function, members 
of the demos need to be united by feelings of solidarity of a certain kind, and be 
willing to make sacrifices for each other.82 But if the boundaries of the demos stretch 
too widely, so the argument goes, the necessary solidarity will be psychologically 
unachievable.83 Global democracy is thus unrealizable. 
There are (at least) two reasons for doubting this argument.  First, while it is 
certainly true that a democratic system could only work in the presence of some 
mutual trust and a minimal level of agreement on principle, solidarity does not appear 
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essential.84 Most contemporary, reasonably well-functioning democratic societies are 
so big that it is difficult for people to develop anything like a strong sense of 
solidarity towards all of their fellow citizens. To be sure, it might be easier to make 
friends or understand one another with a fellow national than with a foreigner, simply 
by virtue of the greater commonality in background experiences. But note that I am 
here talking about co-participation in a democratic system, not about friendship. For 
that, solidarity does not seem essential. 
 Second, even if solidarity were essential to a healthy democracy, the 
suggestion that it uniquely develops along geographical/national lines loses credibility 
in an increasingly globalized world. Solidarity is typically fuelled by commonality of 
circumstances, and the more the world becomes interconnected, the more such 
commonality cuts across borders. For instance, a jobless Spanish citizen post-
financial crisis is likely to feel greater solidarity towards a U.S. citizen in a similar 
position than towards a wealthy Spanish banker. This being the case, the suggestion 
that transnational or global solidarity is impossible appears ill-grounded. 
 Popular sovereignty and civic education. A second, related line of argument, 
pursued by Lea Ypi, holds that only within democratic states can people develop the 
motivational preconditions for realizing common political projects.85 This is thanks to 
these states’ combining popular sovereignty and civic education. The former gives 
legitimacy to political decisions, the latter “creates” citizens, namely active political 
agents with a strong sense of collective responsibility. Crucially, both popular 
sovereignty and civic education are particularistic in nature. They are the products of 
particular historical developments, within particular political communities; and it is 
their historical particularism which explains their ability to motivate people in the 
pursuit of common projects. Rephrased in the terms of the present discussion, the 
view suggests that a demosP, a necessary ingredient of effective democratic agency, 
may only emerge within specific state-like political entities, as a result of specific 
histories.  
 This is an interesting argument, but despite first appearances, it does not 
support the view that a global demosP is altogether impossible. If I read the argument 
correctly, it states that effective political agency must start from where we are, so to 
speak. Nothing precludes the possibility for civic education within states to assume a 
more explicitly postnational, cosmopolitan dimension.86 Indeed—as Ypi herself 
seems to think—nothing precludes states from “transforming themselves” along 
cosmopolitan-democratic lines, from within.87 What the view emphasizes is the 
bottom-up, particularistic nature of the formation of effective political agency. The 
view therefore implies that a global demosP can only emerge starting from existing 
political units and their current political practices. It does not imply that a global 
demosP is incompatible with basic facts about human nature.  
  Let me now turn to the second reason for scepticism about the feasibility of a 
global demosP. 
 
Argument 2: The demosP and global pluralism  
John Rawls, partly following Immanuel Kant, is skeptical about the possibility of a 
free agreement, global in scope, on principles of political morality. On this view, 
liberal-democratic institutions, whether domestic or international, inevitably lead to 
the development of competing moral and political doctrines. From this it follows that 
universal convergence on moral matters could only be achieved coercively, by a 
global despotic government which, to put it in Kant’s words, “after crushing the 
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germs of all goodness, will finally lapse into anarchy.”88 Is this argument convincing? 
It is hard to establish whether it is. 
 To begin with, we do not have clear evidence of the impossibility of full 
agreement about justice at the global level. The good news, though, is that such an 
agreement is simply not needed for the existence of a global demosP. Recall that the 
cohesion conditions for a demosP do not require full agreement about political 
morality. If such an agreement were available, there would be little need for 
democracy in the first place. Instead, the viability of a demosP presupposes some 
agreement on fundamental principles. The claim that such agreement can never 
obtain, except through global despotic imposition, is a hard one to defend.  
 Empirically speaking, a commitment to democratic ideals has proven 
compatible with considerable pluralism. As discussed in the work of John McGarry 
and Brendan O’Leary, for example, the experiences of countries like Canada and 
India show that the prospects for the stability of multi-national, highly diverse 
democratic federations are better than often thought.89 To be sure, existing 
multinational federations are orders of magnitude smaller than the envisaged world 
community. Although we should not be too quick to extrapolate from the “regional” 
to the “global,” these positive experiences cast doubt on the claim that pluralism 
makes a global demosP unviable.  
This form of pluralism-driven scepticism appears all the less well-founded at a 
time when the international community is increasingly converging on a set of 
principles, such as jus cogens and human rights, constituting a common ground on the 
basis of which decisions about international political morality have to be made.90 Of 
course, this does not mean that a global demosP already exists—something I have 
excluded in the previous subsection—but it does undermine the assertion that 
international pluralism makes a global demosP impossible.91  
 
Argument 3: The demosP and epistemic burdens 
Finally, a third reason why a global demosP might be thought to be infeasible, given 
human nature as we know it, invokes the epistemic burdens individuals would have to 
carry in a global democracy. Democracy can only properly work if members of the 
demos are sufficiently well-informed about the decisions that have to be made, their 
grounds and implications. As Robert Dahl and Thomas Christiano have pointed out, 
keeping up with the complexities of domestic political systems is already hard 
enough; keeping up with those of a global political system, in which it is felt that 
one’s own contribution is even less weighty than domestically (due to the size of the 
electorate), will be epistemically and motivationally close to impossible.92  
 This is a serious worry, and one that already applies to domestic 
democracies.93 At the domestic level, some of these epistemic difficulties have been 
mitigated by the professionalization of politics. Party systems and professional 
politicians process and digest information, forming judgments about what to do, 
which citizens can then either endorse or reject.94 Some of the relevant information is 
passed on to citizens, but not all of it is, so as to render the task of making up one’s 
mind more manageable for those who have not chosen politics as their profession. 
Could something similar exist at the global level?  
 Even though we are far from a state of affairs in which global politics is fully 
professionalized, like Daniele Archibugi and David Held, I see no reason for 
categorically excluding this possibility.95 It is not obvious that the coping strategies 
applying at the domestic level could not be employed, mutatis mutandis, at the global 
one.96 Of course, nothing like global political parties yet exist, but there are many 
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social movements, and organizations (e.g., Greenpeace, Amnesty International, the 
WWF and so forth), which play at least a subset of the roles performed by domestic 
political parties in relation to particular global concerns. The potential strength of 
such parties, and their capacity to mobilize political will, should not be 
underestimated.97 Take, for instance, voting in the European Parliament. This has for 
a while followed party lines, rather than national affiliation.98 If this is the case at the 
European supra-national level, then we may plausibly think that a similar 
phenomenon could also occur at the global one, if the relevant global democratic 
institutions were available.99  
 In sum, there appears to be no in-principle insurmountable obstacle to the 
formation of (global) political parties (with local sections), each advancing particular 
ideological agendas concerning how global institutions ought to be organized.100 The 
existence of such parties would significantly reduce the epistemic and motivational 
burdens falling on the members of a global demosP.   
Inaccessibility 
So far, the claim that a global demosP is incompatible with the limits of human nature 
has not proven convincing. But what about its accessibility? Could it be argued that a 
state of affairs in which there exists a global demosP is de facto inaccessible from 
where we are? This argument would be a hard one to make. 
 With the advance of globalization, matters of international concern are 
increasingly figuring in, and influencing, domestic political processes.101 International 
norms often frame, or even determine, political decisions within individual states.102 
Citizens slowly, but increasingly, take an interest in international affairs, be it in 
relation to the UN, NGOs, the World Bank, the IMF and other international organs. If 
we continue on this trajectory, the formation of a global demosP is a long-term 
possibility, and certainly not one that has been proven inaccessible.  
 Robert Goodin has gone so far as to suggest that the advent of global 
democracy is almost inevitable since, as a matter of empirical regularity, once the 
circle of accountability starts to expand—as we are slowly witnessing in the world 
today—it continues to grow and almost never contracts.103 Alexander Wendt has 
similarly suggested that the “logic of international anarchy,” coupled with agents’ 
struggle for recognition, will necessarily lead to the creation of a non-sinister world 
state.104 Kant himself, despite his fears of global despotism, conjectured that human 
beings’ “unsocial sociability”—i.e., their twofold tendency to cooperate within 
society and threaten society’s stability through the desire to act only “in accordance 
with [their] own ideas”—would eventually lead them to create a “global republic.”105 
 These claims about the necessity of a more-or-less democratically organized 
world state have been met with considerable criticism, and for good reason.106 They 
are conjectural, and based on controversial teleological assumptions about the “logics 
of,” respectively, accountability expansion, international anarchy, and human nature. 
Even though proclamations of inevitability are insufficiently well-grounded—and 
arguably insufficiently attentive to the role of human agency in bringing about social 
change—they certainly cast doubt on the assertion that global democracy is 
inaccessible. These arguments may not genuinely show that global democracy is 
inevitable, but they do set out various paths through which it could be accessed from 
where we are.107 In light of this, the claim that a global demosP is demonstrably 
inaccessible also stands on shaky ground. 
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 But what if the worry isn’t one about accessibility simpliciter, but one about 
moral accessibility specifically? 
d. A global demosP cannot come about without excessive moral costs, therefore 
global democracy is morally inaccessible 
The last interpretation of the skeptical slogan says that a global demosP is accessible, 
but “getting there” would involve such high moral costs as to make the fight for 
global democracy not worthwhile. Although I have not (yet) seen this argument 
explicitly made in the democracy literature, here is how it might unfold, inspired by 
Thomas Nagel’s remarks on the problem of global justice.108  
 A demosP always comes about through conflict and struggle against a central, 
despotic power. Individuals with different interests and values may then all come 
together in the fight against arbitrary rule. On this view, it is the common opposition 
to unaccountable power that creates the cohesion conditions for a demosP to exist. 
This means that, before a global demosP can come into being, a global despotic power 
has to emerge. Given the risks associated with such a concentration of power at the 
global level, it is doubtful that the path to global democracy is one worth pursuing. Is 
this argument convincing?  
 I believe not. The main reason for this is that nothing necessitates the 
particular path the above argument suggests.109 Another possibility, and one backed 
by a more sustained investigation, is suggested by Daniel Deudney. Deudney argues 
that the risks associated with violence-interdependence under anarchy have regularly 
pushed different communities to come together under a higher-order system of 
government. Given this historical regularity and the extent of security threats in an era 
of nuclear weapons, we should not be too surprised if a non-despotic global 
government eventually came into being.110 Extrapolating from Deudney’s argument, 
the peoples of the world might come together to form a “global demos” through 
recognizing the necessity of a higher-order governmental structure to manage the 
security threats of an otherwise anarchical international order, rather than through 
common opposition to a global despotic power. 
Alternatively, we could envisage the “bottom up” emergence not so much of 
an all-powerful democratic global state, but of a network of democratically organized 
governance institutions. As argued by transnational deliberative democrats, like John 
Dryzek, although global government is not here,111 there are multiple, somewhat 
decentralized mechanisms of transnational governance—e.g. in the areas of trade, 
finance, and environmental regulation—against which claims for democratization are 
increasingly made.112 For example, the Occupy movement, denouncing the steep 
inequalities generated by (insufficiently) unconstrained capitalism, may be seen as a 
“kernel” of global democracy: it expresses transnational demands for greater 
accountability on the part of global capitalism, and represents a first step towards 
democratizing the global economy.  
 Whether a global democracy would eventually take the same shape as 
domestic democracy—in the form of a global state113—or of a looser system of 
democratically organized governance networks is something I am in no position to 
assess. As I have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there is a plurality of 
institutional proposals, each based on different models of democratic decision-
making. Some emphasize deliberation and the role of activists/civil society,114 others 
insist on the importance of electoral mechanisms and supranational institutions.115  
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 Setting these differences aside, taken together, my arguments show that global 
democratic processes addressing issues of common concern are desirable, morally 
accessible, and not infeasible. Admittedly, nothing in what I have said positively 
demonstrates that global democracy will come about, or how it will come about. As I 
have suggested at the outset, however, precisely indicating the path from here to the 
ideal is not necessary to establish that an ideal is worth pursuing. So long as the ideal 
is desirable, not infeasible, and morally accessible, it has normative power over us.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I wish to: (i) briefly summarize my findings, (ii) indicate how they 
position themselves vis-à-vis existing discussions of global democracy, and (iii) 
respond to an objection “realists” about international politics are likely to raise, 
thereby pointing to the broader implications of my discussion. 
In this paper, I have addressed the question of whether global democracy—
broadly construed—is an ideal worth pursuing. I have looked at four different 
interpretations of the slogan “No global demos, no global democracy,” and concluded 
that none of them implies that the ideal of global democracy should be abandoned. 
Global democracy is desirable—from both an all-subjected and an all-affected 
perspective—and no version of the no-demos thesis convincingly shows that it is 
infeasible or morally inaccessible (see Figure 1, below, for a summary of the structure 
of my argument).  
My argument, however, also suggests that, given the current state of the world, 
the pursuit of global democracy must be carried out with caution. Democracy has 
important preconditions, which are lacking at the international level. As we have seen, 
these include a certain level of mutual trust, ideological cohesion and convergence of 
interests among individuals. The fulfillment of these preconditions is typically 
reflected in the domestic constitutions of liberal-democratic states. Shared 
constitutional principles express the “public political culture” binding together 
members of the demos “performatively understood.”116 The lack of a global demosP, 
with a shared political culture, implies that the pursuit of global democracy needs to 
be accompanied by the strengthening of the international rule of law, and the creation 
of those conditions (valuable in and of themselves) that would allow global 
democratic arrangements to flourish.117  
By acknowledging that global democracy has important preconditions, the 
view I have presented accommodates the concerns of those critics of global 
democracy, like Miller and Song, who nevertheless argue for the establishment of a 
(non-democratic) global rule of law, determining which exercises of international 
power are permissible and which ones are not.118 Just like them, I readily admit that 
forms of international “affectedness” or “subjection” which lead to the foreseeable 
underfulfilment of genuinely fundamental rights should be straightforwardly 
outlawed, as a matter of “international constitutional constraints.” Unlike them, 
however, I also emphasize that, beyond securing certain fundamental guarantees, 
people reasonably disagree about how the global order should be organized. As I have 
argued above, controversial but important normative political questions—e.g. about 
trade, finance, climate change, and immigration—need to be decided in line with the 
commitment to equal respect, that is democratically.119 Resort to constitutional 
guarantees is thus not an alternative to democracy beyond borders, but one of its 
preconditions and complements. 
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 These qualifications bring my defence of global democracy close to the 
“progressive realist” stance defended by William Scheuerman. Like me, and unlike 
global-democratic skeptics, progressive realists are not opposed to, or deeply 
pessimistic about, the advent of global democracy. However, unlike global 
democratic enthusiasts, they do not assume that democratizing reforms alone “can 
effectively create their own social and political presuppositions.”120 Until those 
presuppositions come into being, attempting to establish “global democracy” will 
indeed be “illusory” if not dangerous. A plausible defence of global democracy, I 
have suggested, cannot neglect to acknowledge this fact. 
 This assertion is likely to invite the following objection. If global democracy 
is only a distant possibility, and its advent by no means guaranteed, why invest 
intellectual energy in theorizing about it? Would it not be better to focus on short- and 
medium-term reforms of the international arena aimed at fostering peace, security, 
and non-democratic forms of accountability?  
 Two considerations can be advanced in response. First, if global democracy is 
indeed desirable and not infeasible, theorizing about it matters on normative grounds. 
By abandoning global democracy as a worthy object of discussion because of its 
alleged “utopian character,” we would in all likelihood worsen the prospects of it ever 
being realized. Pessimism about, and disengagement with, global democracy may 
well turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. 
 Second, and perhaps more interestingly, theorizing about global democracy 
and theorizing about short-/medium-term reforms of the global arena are 
complementary, rather than mutually exclusive, exercises. On the one hand, as I have 
already suggested, an awareness of the practical challenges of global reform—
including of short-term reform—can ensure against naïve global-democratic 
enthusiasm, which is potentially counter-productive to the cause of democratizing the 
global arena. On the other hand, theorizing about short-term reforms without keeping 
in mind our “ultimate goal” may lead us astray. For while some such reforms might 
take us further in the direction of a globally democratic world, others might hinder its 
realization.121 
 For example, Grant and Keohane helpfully discuss a number of 
“accountability devices” operating within the international arena, but which fall short 
of participatory, democratic standards.122 Among them are “reputational” 
accountability mechanisms, by which international actors that fail to abide by key 
normative principles—e.g. they violate basic human-rights standards, they take unfair 
advantage of their bargaining power—may come under severe criticism and suffer 
significant losses as a result. Examples that immediately come to mind (in part also 
discussed by Grant and Keohane) include campaigns against the use of sweatshop 
labour by international corporations, protests against WTO agricultural subsidies, and 
the Occupy movement against unfettered, unaccountable free-market capitalism. 
Enhancing these forms of accountability, by building an ever-stronger civil society, 
may be of value not only in and of itself, but also with a view to consolidating the 
preconditions for the establishment of democratic procedures beyond the state. 
Enhancing reputational accountability requires greater transparency in world politics, 
which is itself a prerequisite of well-functioning democratic decision mechanisms.123  
 By contrast, the strengthening of other types of international accountability 
may be undesirable if considered in the light of an ultimate, global-democratic goal. 
For instance, as Grant and Keohane explain, what they call “supervisory 
accountability” typically applies only to weak states which, in periods of crisis, are 
willing to submit to the dictates of international institutions such as the World Bank 
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and the IMF, in exchange for all-important financial support.124 Given that these 
institutions themselves fall short of full democratic standards, and perhaps 
disproportionately represent the interests of global capital and powerful Western 
nations, making states more accountable to them could constitute a step away from a 
possible global democratic future—at least until these institutions are themselves 
restructured in a more democratic way. Keeping the ideal in sight, then, can help us 
select among short-term feasible reforms of the international arena. 
 In sum, while I side with global democrats in thinking that global democracy 
is, in general, and ideal worth pursuing, I also believe that its pursuit should be carried 
out “intelligently,” bearing in mind what its preconditions are, and moving 
incrementally towards their establishment. A somewhat myopic focus on those 
(missing) preconditions has led some critics to reject the ideal of global democracy 
altogether. Unlike those critics, I am willing to think beyond the establishment of 
those conditions, and envisage the factual possibility and normative desirability of a 
somewhat distant globally democratic future.  
 
 
Figure 1: Analysis of the “no-global-demos thesis”
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2 See e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007. 
3 See Gallagher 2009. 
4 See Blake and Smith 2013 for an overview. 
5 Rixen 2011. 
6 Ronzoni 2009. 
7 Keohane and Victor 2011. 
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12 Miller 2010a; Risse 2012, 342; Dahl 1999; Axtmann 2002; Song 2012; for a review see Archibugi 
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see Tinnevelt and Geenens 2008.  
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15 Keohane 2006, 77. 
16 Cf. Scheuerman 2011, chap. 4. 
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18 Goodin 2010. 
19 Falk and Strauss 2000; Held 1995; Archibugi 2008. 
20 Keohane 2006, 77. 
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22 Gilabert 2011; Lawford-Smith 2013. 
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inaccessibility (since it is a combination of desirability and non-infeasibility). Since this label would be 
rather clumsy, I shall refer to it using the expression “moral accessibility” instead. 
29 Räikkä 1998. 
30 Gallie 1955. 
31 The different meanings of “apply” will be discussed below. 
32 For an overview see Christiano 2008a. 
33 See e.g. Dworkin 2002, 186; Arneson 2004. I am here setting aside epistemic democracy. 
34 See e.g. Christiano 2008; Waldron 1999; Valentini 2013. 
35 Beitz 1989; Dahl 1989, chap. 6. 
36 List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010. 
37 Their main aim, in the cited article, is to set out a conceptual framework for thinking about the 
demos performatively understood, based on the theory of group agency. As will become apparent later 
in my discussion, I partly—but not exclusively—draw on this framework in my own characterization 
of the demos from a performative point of view. 
38 I here set aside discourse-theoretic approaches to defining the demos, because they hold that the 
demos itself should be democratically or politically established: there is thus no purely theoretical 
account of what the demos is/who belongs to it. See e.g. Benhabib’s 2011 notion of “democratic 
iterations,” Fraser’s 2009 notion of “meta-democracy,” and Bohman’s 2007, 92, account of how demoi 
are constituted. Thanks to Markus Patberg for drawing my attention to this. 
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39 Another criterion is what List and Koenig-Archibugi 2010, 81, call “affectivity,” according to which 
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plausible way of fleshing out what it is for a decision to apply to someone, hence I do not discuss it 
here. For a critique of it see Abizadeh 2005. 
40 See Näsström 2011; Song 2012 for discussion. 
41 Abizadeh 2008; Abizadeh 2012; Beckman 2009, 72; see e.g. McMahon 1994, 12; Näsström 2011; 
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42 Abizadeh 2012, 878 n.25; cf. Song 2009. 
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affected interests” with a status-quo-based notion of affectedness) are equivalent. On this see Goodin 
2007, 52–53. Thanks to Christian List for discussion of this point.  
48 For example, T. Macdonald 2008 adopts a version of the principle according to which a say should 
be granted to those whose capacity for autonomy is impacted by certain decisions. 
49 Nozick 1974, 269. I am grateful to Arash Abizadeh for raising this objection.  
50 On constitutional constraints see Rawls 1996; Dworkin 1986, chap. 10; Barry 1995, chap. 4; Fabre 
2000; cf. Habermas 1996, sec 3.1 on private vs public autonomy. 
51 I here do not commit myself to any substantive account of what interests are important, and which 
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Valentini 2013. 
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56 See e.g. Song 2012; Keohane 2006, 77; Risse 2012, 342; Scheuerman 2011, 106–121. Note, 
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67 Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010. 
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70 Christiano 2006, 100ff. 
71 Some reasonable agreement does not mean full agreement, and the question arises as to how 
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solution would be to fall back on a principle of equality in decision-making, in light of the 
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normative preferability of proportionality. The fact that proportionality is hard to realize in practice 
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78 Dryzek 2011, 215–216. 
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Archibugi 2011b.  
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